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Crises are, by definition, interpretive issues, if for no other reason than
assessments of their existence or magnitude often become causal explanations for
change. The debate over peasant standard of living in late imperial Russia—the “crisis”
of Russia’s rural economy—is an interpretive issue tackled by historians from a number
of different perspectives and with varying degrees of success. Recent work casting
doubt upon the decline of peasant living standards highlights the inadequacies of
historians’ selected assessment tools and suggests that better (demographic) measures
will not only expose the crisis as non-existent but reveal ‘the heretical possibility that the
reforms of the 1860s might have actually bettered the peasant’s lot’.1 But it is one thing
for historians to demonstrate that the crisis was non-existent and quite another to
explain why contemporaries saw the peasant economy as a crisis-ridden institution. At
first glance, the answer to this question appears obvious. Peasant ‘backwardness’, the
constraints of communal tenure, and tax arrears all pointed to an economy unable to
meet its obligations. At the same time, post-emancipation descriptions of peasant life—
culminating, perhaps, with A. I. Shingarev’s The Dying Village (1907)—offered an image
of peasant life so dire and radically at odds with that of the Empire’s westernized elite
that few in educated society could look upon the village and its economy and see
anything other than crisis (even though they might disagree among themselves as to its
cause).2 However, given the fact that historians (like Russian statisticians and
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agronomists before them) devote so much attention to measuring peasant standard of
living it is surprising that none address the impact of the 'rise of statistical thinking' and
attendant forms of economic measurement on the creation of this crisis perception.3 A
growing emphasis on measuring the sufficiency of peasant land allotments in terms of
assessed land values (the application of cadastre measurement) created a statistical
portrait of rural crisis. Statistical measurement—the conversion of economic
phenomena into numbers—objectified the crisis and surrounded it with the aura of
‘scientific’ objectivity.4 The melding of this new cadastre measure of ‘sufficiency’ with
traditional paternalism made peasant living standards appear desperate and the state’s
failure to protect its subjects deplorable.

Statistics and Sufficiency
The state began enumerating its taxable assets with the first of a series of tax
censuses (revizii) in 1720-1721.5 By the mid-eighteenth century, spurred by the Free
Economic Society, magnate serf owners and their managers were using improved
record-keeping practices to compile systematic serf household inventories.
Enumeration implied control and maximum exploitation of these assets. For the state
and its noble servitors alike, ‘high revenues rested on the ability of estate administrators
to make each serf tiaglo (labor team) equally capable of cultivating the land without
exhausting the peasants or their draft animals’.

6

Proper analysis of estate production

might also reveal paths to more efficient serf management and asset allocation, such as
one author’s conclusion that serfs tilling improved land produced greater income.7 In
areas less conducive to agriculture, estate managers and bureaucrats focussed on the
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totality of peasant household economic activity—farming, trades and wages—in order
to discover possible insufficiencies, and duly recorded each household’s endowment of
labor, inventory, and non-agricultural earnings.8 Managers, assisted by communal
elders, maximized income by ensuring that each household had sufficient resources to
meet obligations to lord, commune and state. They apportioned estate lands evenly
between peasant household labor teams, and evidence indicates that other assets
remained rather evenly distributed on the basis of ability to work and pay. As historian
Peter Czap noted, ‘the commune and/or estate administration achieved a high degree
of success in controlling [the distribution of horses and land,] and in this way enforced
their own criteria for a minimum standard of living among all the households on the
estate’.9
It is difficult to imagine that all serf owners operated as efficiently as the
Gagarins, Sheremetevs, or other magnates. One also suspects that even the most
diligent estate stewards failed to control all sources of peasant income through
enumeration. Yet, managers of serfs and state peasants knew that their income
depended on maintaining their productive assets—on ensuring that each household had
sufficient resources to engage in agriculture, trades, wage labor, or some combination
of employment. As historian Steven Hoch noted, estate bailiffs ‘did not ruthlessly exploit
their peasants for short-run gains’, realizing that ‘the profitability of the estate was
directly related to the peasants’ material well-being’. Such paternalism was ‘more selfserving than benign’. This concept of sufficiency emerged in public discussions of
estate management. Managers well knew the allotment size necessary, under given
environmental conditions, to maintain the estate’s servile assets and produce revenue. 10
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This traditional concept of ‘sufficiency’ was a ‘moral economy’ in which masters
gauged the health of their assets (and the extent to which they could exploit them) not in
terms of land productivity, but in terms of each household’s total income from all
sources. This paternalistic model manifested itself in a number of nineteenth-century
peasant reforms, including the serf emancipation of 1861.11
From this perspective, peasant households were not participants in a single
market economy, but autarkic units (the commune a collection of such units) existing
within a separate natural economy that, hopefully, met their material needs, and at the
same time guarantee their ability to pay a variety of obligations and taxes. Peasants
were economic assets to be maintained and exploited by state, court, or—prior to
1861—serf owner. The rural economy thus consisted of two sectors—peasant and
noble (pomeshchik). This conception of a dual rural economy became codified in the
emancipation process, in which officials hoped that land allotments would provide for
basic peasant needs and that compensation provided to former serf owners would lead
to the intensification of noble agriculture. Combined with the granting of land
allotments, reformers believed that strengthening the commune in the emancipation
process (and afterwards) would permanently guarantee peasants access to sufficient
resources and immunize them from proletarianization. Thus, 'in Russia, from the midseventeenth century, being a peasant (with few exceptions) implied an entitlement to
land'.12
This paternalistic emphasis on sufficiency or well-being (much in line with other
European states' increasing activism in the name of public welfare) persisted until the
empire's demise in 1917 (to be taken up in modified form by the Bolsheviks). However,
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this posed the question of what sort of measurement best suited these goals. By the
1830s, reformers who envisioned an Empire based on the rule of law and the rational
administration of Russia’s agrarian resources were already familiar with a European
technique that appeared to be ideally suited for measuring an agrarian economy: a
cadastre. Cadastral surveys performed a number of tasks for European states—from
facilitating land reclamation in Holland through recording the results of land reforms and
creating ordered colonial settlement patterns. Their most significant role in
administration, however (dating from the financial burdens of the Thirty Years' War and
regularized in much of Europe under Napoleon) lay in land taxation.13 Cadastres rested
on the assumption that all farmers lived as “economic men” seeking maximum profits.
The main variable and principal object of measurement in any economic assessment,
therefore, was the land itself. By assessing soil fertility (type), average production costs
for various types of grain, and location (distance to market), one could arrive at a
property’s objective value. Europe's economists, statisticians and state servitors
believed that cadastral surveys were so crucial to rational administration that when their
representatives met in Brussels in 1853 for the First International Statistical Congress,
cadastres topped their agenda. The Congress' subsequent resolution noted that
cadastres not only provided a rational basis for state fiscal operations, but also supplied
individual property owners with a means to trace and demonstrate their ownership.
State and liberal goals could be mapped simultaneously.14
A cadastre offered Russian officials a systematic portrait of the Empire’s land
assets and productive capabilities that would allow them to foster more general
prosperity by developing infrastructure and adjusting taxes (up or down) to reflect
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income. Furthermore, it provided a measure that was especially useful because it
universalized the agricultural economy. Differences between peasant and non-peasant
levels of production were simply attributed to the ‘irrationality’ of the benighted masses.
The Empire’s rural economy was thus heterogeneous only in the sense that it covered a
wide and diverse territory. This cadastre paradigm projected an image of Russia as a
society of rational actors in which (ironically) the estate-based particularism of the old
regime would ultimately disappear.15 From this perspective, the cadastre as a form of
measurement reflected modern, universalistic assumptions about Russia’s rural
economy and society. Its focus on land and its elimination of the human factor
promised a rational basis of administration and an objective basis for taxation.
Cadastral maps and tables would allow officials to ‘see like a state,’ and thus bring
Russia’s vast land resources under their control.16
Officials' increased desire and ability to enumerate and tabulate--especially in
cadastral terms--created a statistical image of a peasant economy mired in crisis.
Combined with a tradition of maintaining peasants as productive serf assets and the
emancipation’s goal of creating an autarkic peasant economy, calculating land value by
such bookkeeping means implied that peasant household sufficiency could now be
objectively measured in terms of land productivity and assessed value. As renowned
geographer and statistician P. P. Semenov argued during debates on the serf
emancipation process, this assumption was erroneous for two reasons.17 First,
cadastres were instruments designed to equalize the distribution of land taxes. They
did not provide the actual value of the land, but only its relative value (i. e., its value for
tax purposes in relation to that of other properties). Thus it was possible that, ‘by the
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rules of a cadastre the incomes on some estates increase and others decrease by 10,
20, 30 and more percent’.18 Second, Semenov noted that a cadastral system
contradicted the dual rural economy—with peasant and noble components—being
constructed in the serf emancipation process:
If the land remaining…in peasant use as a guarantee of their life served them like
capital…then…reassessments [cadastral surveys] would not be excessively
burdensome for peasants. But for them remains, and with several reductions,
their existing allotments—only that guaranteeing their existence. Almost all
production from the land given out to the peasant goes directly to feed him and
not for trade speculation.19
Thus, as a measure, cadastres were unsuited both for determining actual land
values and measuring peasant well-being. As the agrarian economist A. V. Chaianov
later noted, using ‘a series of conventional methods, pricing family labor at wage rates,
and so on, you can, of course, calculate “capitalist rent” in the economic sense…. But
these exercises…will have no social and economic content’.20 Or, as the English
observer Donald MacKenzie Wallace observed in the 1870s:
The rural life, and…economic organization, of Russia is so peculiar…that even
the fullest data regarding the quantity of land enjoyed by the peasantry, the
amount of dues paid for it, the productivity of the soil, [and] the price of
grain…would convey to the Englishman’s mind no clear conception of the
peasants’ actual condition.21
Nonetheless, although lords, state officials like Semenov, and others (zemstvos22
and their employees) interested in the peasant economy certainly knew that the peasant
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economy was different—that it was a ‘natural economy’ with little connection to the
market—few suggested until the mid-1880s that peasant economic activity (well-being)
could not be measured and evaluated in market terms via the cadastral process. The
state found such universalism convenient--a way to simplify the process of collecting
taxes.23 In addition, Adam Smith and the works of the so-called Manchester School
found a ready audience in Russia, even if Russian readers tended to interpret them in a
manner that could only make true believers in laissez faire cringe. The extent to which
peasants (and their economic activity) strayed from the path of rational economic
activity could be explained by either their own benightedness or the institution of
communal land tenure.24 Thus, as the chair of the Main Committee on Peasant Affairs,
Ia. I. Rostovtsov, argued early in the serf emancipation process, the emancipation 'must
lead the peasant both to a freedom of labor, as a source of his further spiritual
development, and to an improvement in his material well-being'.25 Emancipation would
remove a key obstacle preventing peasants from developing into rational economic
actors like everyone else.
By the mid-1880s statisticians employed to perform tax assessment work for
many of Russia's zemstvo institutions—filled with a healthy dose of historical economics
from Germany and a populist faith in the historical mission of Russia's peasantry—had
before them enough data to conclude that an accurate assessment of peasant land
income required consideration of 'social factors' beyond market data.26 Average market
figures for production costs and sale prices did not reflect the natural character of a
peasant household economy that produced with its own labor and inventory and
consumed the majority of its produce. Yet, in spite of this insight—which led to the
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compilation of household inventory and budget data—zemstvo statisticians continued
to assess peasant well-being in market (i.e., cadastre) terms by assigning market
values to budget components and comparing these to figures on peasant tax and
redemption payments. The results—especially when researchers assigned a market
value to the actual labor peasants invested on their plots—nearly always resulted in a
negative bottom line. Measuring peasant economic activity in market terms failed to
account for the peculiarities of natural (subsistence) economies. As the discussion
below indicates, they were not alone in this practice, even though they and others
remained uneasy about the results. Only the advent of the Organization and Production
School of economics—which measured well-being relative to a household's structure,
consumption needs, and organization of production (and considered the marginal utility
of each unit of labor in a subsistence economy)—provided a means of measuring wellbeing within the non-capitalist peasant economy that did not portray peasant
households as perpetual money-losing (and hence, crisis-ridden) enterprises.27
Thus, as officials grappled with the task of reforming peasant life throughout the
post-emancipation period their concerns about peasant household sufficiency (wellbeing) constantly collided with a modern vision of the Empire’s rural economy that could
be measured, mapped and taxed solely in terms of the productivity of the soil or land
value. The collision stemmed largely from the fact that book-keeping methods
associated with a cadastre increasingly came to be seen as a measure of household
sufficiency. ‘Sufficient’ peasant land allotments became ‘insufficient’ when observers
focussed accountant’s eyes on peasant allotments. This combination of a traditional
concern for sufficiency with a measurement instrument designed for tax assessment
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created the impression that the state had cheated peasants in the emancipation
process and, in doing so, doomed the peasant economy to perpetual poverty. This
crisis perception colored state peasant policies until the end of the old regime.

Sufficiency (Ability to Pay) and Land Value in Kiselev’s Reforms and the
Emancipation
The first attempt at cadastration came in the 1840s under the auspices of A. P.
Zablotskii-Desiatovskii's Statistical Section of the Ministry of State Domains’ Department
of Rural Economy. Work began in 1842 as part of Minister of State Domains Count P.
D. Kiselev's reform of the state peasantry. Preliminary research indicated that, although
the state assigned each commune a collective tax burden based on the number of
taxable male inhabitants, the commune attached this burden to land; when communes
repartitioned their lands, they also repartitioned tax burden. The main problem with this
system, Kiselev noted, was the disproportion of taxes with land revenues. Thus,
improving the state peasantry’s lot and regularizing tax receipts required shifting tax
burden from persons to land. A cadastre seemed the most logical means of achieving
all of these goals.28
Between 1842 and 1856, cadastral commissions surveyed state peasant lands in
twenty-five provinces, classifying these holdings according to fertility, calculating the
labor necessary for cultivation, and compiling series data on local grain prices.29
However, regional variations in Russia’s rural economy soon confronted officials with a
perplexing problem. Land evaluation proved adequate for fertile black-soil regions, but
in the north and other areas where cottage industry and wage labor comprised the bulk
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of peasant income, the cadastral system failed. Although poor soils often failed to
meet basic consumption needs, peasant incomes in these areas were nonetheless
high. These circumstances forced officials to collect data on non-agricultural incomes,
thereby converting obrok (quitrent) into “a crude income tax rather than a land tax.”30
Thus, they measured not only the land’s ability to yield an adequate income, but also
the adequacy of the household’s total income. As a result of these endeavors the
government was able to equalize the tax burden for most state peasants and increase
its annual revenues by six million rubles without increasing the tax rate. Reformers also
succeeded in allotting additional land to peasants whose parcels, measured by
cadastral means, appeared insufficient.31 However, they also discovered the limitations
Russian conditions imposed on a cadastral process. Total income (ability to pay)
prevailed—both as a gauge of peasant sufficiency and state efficiency.
The process of granting a landed emancipation to twenty-two million serfs
exacerbated the tension between the old concept of sufficiency (overall ability to pay)
and the emerging new concept of sufficiency framed in cadastre terms (the actual value
of peasant land allotments). Alexander II’s initial parameters for a landed emancipation
were ambiguous. Imperial Rescripts stipulated a landed emancipation, but gave no
direction as to the composition or permanency of peasant allotments. 32 However, his
appointment of Ia. I. Rostovtsev as head of the Editing Commissions charged with
drafting the emancipation statutes ensured that the Rescripts’ “great principles”—that
peasants would perceive an improvement in their lives and receive an allotment with
which to maintain themselves and fulfill their obligations—would find a place in
discussions. These principles, in Rostovtsev’s mind, came to mean sufficiency in the
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traditional paternalistic sense (i. e., an ability to pay); the emancipation statute not
only needed to guarantee peasants a sufficient quantity of plowland, but also access on
some level to other resources necessary for households to meet their subsistence
requirements and obligations to the state (i.e., access to the pasture, forest and other
resources to which they were accustomed). For ‘personal liberty’ to be meaningful,
emancipated serfs needed a sufficient quantity of all resources necessary for
maintaining their livelihoods.33
Based on these principles, the Editing Commissions’ Economic Section resolved
that peasants could reject allotments only if other means existed to guarantee their
livelihood.34 It also argued forcefully (especially in the absence of reliable data) for
giving peasants allotments in their current sizes. Noble landowners on the provincial
committees, concerned with the pace at which their assets appeared to melt before their
eyes, countered that the use of current allotment size would benefit those who had
granted miserly allotments, penalize those who had been generous, and strip serf
owners of all their land in northern and steppe areas where typically serfs had access to
the entire estate and paid obrok.35 Only allotments based on ‘artificial norms’ (i. e., not
existing allotments), ‘and besides this [ones of] the smallest possible size’ could ‘lead to
the swift and natural substitution of compulsory labor by free labor in rural life’.36 To
make this selfish proposition more attractive, they also averred that an artificial norms
would create uniformity conducive to tax assessment. Finally, in response to
accusations that defining an artificial allotment would be an arbitrary process, nobles
proposed that existing allotments, ‘established exclusively under the influence of
serfdom’, were no less arbitrary.37
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Both Rostovtsev and the Economic Section rejected these arguments
(although they sympathized with the predicament presented by northern and steppe
obrok estates). For Rostovtsev, any ‘cut-offs’ (otrezki) necessary to remedy the varied
conditions of serf allotments could not deprive peasants of ‘their current means of
existence’.38 The Economic Section noted that reducing allotments contradicted state
goals. It also disagreed that existing allotments were arbitrary, noting that ‘with few
exceptions’ they rested ‘on the strength of the centuries-old relations and mutual
benefits of one and another soslovie [social estate] placed upon the pomeshchik, and
the moral and material necessity of maintaining in sufficient sizes the life of his
peasant’.39 Other considerations also favored maintaining the past conception of
sufficiency after the emancipation. The task of devising an ‘artificial’ allotment norm
was prohibitively complex. It would require the state to ‘define with desired accuracy
the very needs of the peasant in each locale’, including ‘the actual productivity of the
land allotment’ and ‘the degree of benefit each peasant obtained from primary, and in
particular, auxiliary, trades that serve as supplementary income to that received from
the land’. The state barely had means to survey existing allotments, let alone new
ones.40 The Economic Section also suggested that artificial norms would ultimately
undermine both peasants and nobles because resultant peasant dissatisfaction might
exceed the state’s ability to maintain order.41
To avoid penalizing serf owners who previously granted large allotments, the
Economic Section planned to define “existing allotments” not as they actually were, but
as a range of sizes deemed average for a given locale. Peasants with current
allotments outside of this norm received either additional land or a reduction. Peasants
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eligible for additional land (those whose current allotment size fell below the minimum
for the area) received it only if they agreed to assume the additional obligations
attached to it, and only if supplementing peasant allotments did not shrink the demesne
to less than one-third of its current size.42 The Economic Section also acted to ensure
‘sufficiency’ for both sosloviia when it chose to rely on past custom to specify peasant
access rights to pastures and forests.43 However, the commitment to compensate
nobles at some level (thus providing capital to intensify cultivation on the remainder of
their estates); the inability to do so from state coffers because of a banking crisis; and
the subsequent need to determine how much peasants would have to pay to redeem
their allotments (redemption payments—vykupnye platezhi) raised the issue of the
actual value of peasant allotments. The state’s self-assigned role as banker for the
redemption operation gave it a vital interest in determining the actual value of the lands
for which it soon held forty-nine year mortgages.44
The market provided reformers with little assistance. Serf-owners could not sell
land without its attached labor supply, and thus market prices (to the extent that they
existed at all) provided little indication of land value. The Editing Commissions, of
course, received voluminous assistance from serf owners themselves (members of the
provincial committees), for whom the prospect of losing their servile labor supply
necessitated a reconceptualization of the value of their assets (i.e., what the land and
serf labor cost individually).45 Thus it is not surprising, given heightened noble concern
with the value of their assets, state concerns about its proposed credit operation, and
several participants’ involvement in Kiselev’s reforms, that the idea of determining land
values by cadastral means entered the discussion. Reformers soon concluded that a
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lack of reliable information and the state goal of improving peasant life necessitated
using current obligations as a basis for calculating post-emancipation obligations.46
However, this solution satisfied few completely, and several provincial committees and
Editing Commission members recommended a periodic re-evaluation of peasant
obligations in light of current average grain prices or a cadastre.
P. P. Semenov—a person eminently knowledgeable in the realm of statistics—
labeled the first action unjust and the second impractical. Using a “grain rent” formula in
Russia was unjust because poor infrastructure and long distances to markets created
imperfections in Russia’s grain market.47 Creating a cadastre also presented problems.
The French cadastre begun in 1807 was expensive and hardly perfect. The Austrian
cadastre initiated in 1817 was still not done. Prussia completed cadastres only in its
Westphalian and Rhine provinces.48 Classifying land by whole areas instead of single
estates—a method eventually adopted during Kiselev’s reforms—simplified the process.
However, in this situation, Semenov argued, such a method could only lead to
unsatisfactory results. In particular, in 1842 the Ministry of State Domains found it
necessary to use ‘more accurate methods of enumeration’ (i. e., to collect data on nonagricultural income). In short, repeating the process for the lands used by serfs would
be an even larger project—a task for which the state had neither sufficient means nor
time.49 Furthermore, Semenov argued, as instruments designed for equalizing the
distribution of land taxes, cadastres did not provide the actual value of the land, but only
its relative value. This made such a method unsuitable for determining peasant
obligations (and pomeshchik compensation) because ‘with a cadastre, obrok would be
either very low (to the disadvantage of the pomeshchik) or so high that paying it would
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be disastrous for peasants’.50 The ‘shock’ to the values of pomeshchik estates would
be especially great in non-black soil regions and the increase in peasant payment
burdens would be onerous in agricultural areas. From this it followed that, while using a
cadastre to determine peasant payments did not meet the Editing Commissions’ goals
of guaranteeing peasant livelihoods and establishing nobles as capitalist farmers, the
‘existing fact’ of current payments did.51
Because of the complications involved in obtaining (in a timely fashion) and
interpreting necessary data and the fact that the emancipation process contributed to
the creation of a separate peasant economy based on subsistence, the drafters of the
redemption procedures followed the lead of Prussia and Austria by using average local
obrok (quitrent) as a basis for assigning value to the allotments. The commission
calculating land values capitalized obrok payments at six percent.52 Thus, difficulties
surrounding the emancipation resulted in redemption payments that, again, said more
about the ability of peasants to pay than about the actual value of the allotments. By
1878, 7,747,265 ‘revisional souls’ (peasant tax units) were redeeming 27,630,467
desiatiny of land with redemption payments totaling 43,741,493 rubles.53
However, in spite of basing redemption payments on existing obligations, the
abolition of serf status, the Rescripts, and the redemption operation implied something
quite different, namely that: a) the allotment should guarantee peasants’ subsistence
needs and; b) that the allotment should also yield an income sufficient for meeting
payment obligations—including redemption payments. In essence, the government
caught itself in the emancipation’s ambiguity. Capitalizing obrok—the peasant’s ability
to pay—manifested continuance of the serf economy, whereby sufficiency meant
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guaranteeing the existence of human assets as a means of guaranteeing income.
However, the emancipation process, including the redemption operation, inserted
something quite different into this equation: the concept that land had a value in and of
itself. This was a somewhat novel idea in a country where land surplus and labor
shortage had linked land and labor in the institution of serfdom. It seemed quite
reasonable to many that the increasing availability of data on the agrarian economy
made it possible to measure whether or not the emancipation met its own goals by
calculating allotment values and comparing them to payments.

Statistical Research and the “Insufficient Allotment”
The most prominent investigation, St. Petersburg University professor of
statistics Iu. E. Ianson's study of peasant land allotments and payments, appeared in
1877.54 This first edition received simultaneous praise and criticism for suggesting that
peasants received insufficient allotments in the course of the emancipation. Feeling
compelled to respond to critics—most notably Dmitrii F. Samarin—Ianson issued a
second edition of his work in 1881.55 In addition to denying his invention of any ‘theory
of insufficient allotments’, and offering readers a chance to judge the book for
themselves, Ianson argued that the book was an important guide to economic policy,
especially in Russia. Statistical study was crucial to the state’s paternalistic duty to
foster economic sufficiency and development:
That which in Western Europe is now only propagandized as the highest
principle of economic science—the state’s leading significance in the attainment
of public welfare—has historically entered into public life here. State power
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stands here not only by the controls of the administrative mechanism, but at
the helm of economic success and progress. …[U]nder these conditions the
study of economic life comprises a necessary prerequisite of correct state
action….56
Ianson presented a cautious study. By necessity, the work used average figures
that could not be applied to specific peasant allotments. This bothered him for
methodological reasons. He regretted the work’s limited source base (mainly the
Valuev Commission’s published work) and noted that he had avoided a large volume of
anecdotal evidence related to peasant land rental and purchase because he saw ‘no
significant strength of proof in such non-statistical data’.57 Yet, he stood by his
conviction that the book depicted ‘one of the many causes…of the unfavorable
economic condition of a significant number of former serfs’—namely that in spite of the
state's intentions, the landed emancipation left peasants without sufficient means to
feed themselves and meet payment obligations.58 Income derived from peasant
allotments did not correspond to payments levied against them. Ianson's work, which
carried the scientific prestige of his university chair, thus converted the cadastre into a
new measure of household sufficiency. It suggested that the state’s paternalistic duty
required new legislation that considered actual land values, rather than total household
income.
Beginning with an examination of allotments and payments in non-black soil
provinces, Ianson acknowledged that allotments could not themselves be sufficient in
these areas.59 However, while noting that peasants in these areas had a long history or
supplementing their incomes with non-agricultural pursuits, his analysis of consumption
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needs, production costs, and harvests also pointed out that these allotments were
insufficient even for feeding peasant families. ‘Given the insufficiency of allotments’, he
noted, ‘it is understandable that not only all taxes, but even redemption payments
cannot be paid from the land’s income’. Redemption payments two to three times the
obrok payments of local state peasants exacerbated the situation, especially as local
wages were often so low that they failed to ameliorate the situation. Data collected for
zemstvo tax assessments, which calculated average income for an extended period of
time, confirmed this.60
His analysis of black-soil provinces revealed that even in this fertile region,
generally considered profitable for farming, peasant allotments did not fulfill the
emancipation’s goal of providing peasants with sustenance and the ability to make
payments.61 Using official data, Ianson posited a series of average peasant families
and proceeded, again, to calculate net allotment income by subtracting consumption
needs and production costs measured in market prices. The end result was virtually the
same as in non-black soil areas. While, on paper, peasants could generally feed
themselves from their allotments, the land did not generate a surplus for redemption
and other payments.62 In part this was because even though redemption payments in
nine black-soil provinces were from 14% (Orel) to 48% (Riazan’) less than preemancipation quitrents, post-emancipation allotments were smaller in all provinces but
three. In addition, he argued, ‘cut-offs’—deprivation of free access to pasture and
firewood—also negated much of the benefit of lower payments. These items now had
to be purchased from the local lord and thus constituted a further strain on peasant
budgets.63 Thus, in many cases peasant economic conditions were ‘worse than under
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serfdom’. Current land allotments, ‘without other guarantees of their welfare’ not only
could not protect peasants ‘from poverty and proletarianization, but sometimes even
deprived them of their daily bread’. Calculated in market terms, peasant income was
‘fictional’.64 By 1895 Ianson’s argument—which confirmed the suspicions of the populist
intelligentsia—was immortalized in late imperial Russia’s most authoritative reference
work, Brokgauz and Efron’s Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’. According to the encyclopedia,
Ianson’s work ‘had established beyond a doubt the inadequacy of peasant land
allotments and their excessively high assessments.65
Dmitrii Samarin, a landowner and commentator on peasant affairs, attacked
Ianson's work by noting that redemption payments had never been intended to
correspond to the actual value of the land, and therefore could in no way be connected
to the size or actual value of peasant allotments. Redemption payments were simply
another tax—a personal obligation to the state. However, this point tended to be
ignored, as other research supported Ianson's conclusions. As an increasing number of
Russia’s zemstvos turned to collecting statistical data for local tax assessment, these
data (which also calculated allotment income using market prices) supported Ianson’s
conclusions and further disseminated the notion of insufficient allotments among the
reading public.66 Moscow statistician V. I. Orlov noted in his study of the peasant
economy that the lack of correspondence between payments and allotment income was
one of the chief factors contributing to peasant abandonment of allotments and frequent
communal repartitions. These actions increased the burden on other villagers who,
because of the principle of collective responsibility, became responsible for the
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additional dues. Tver’ statistician V. I. Pokrovskii reached similar conclusions after an
analysis of hypothetical family budgets revealed average deficits of nearly sixty rubles. 67
Other research from the academic community also supported Ianson’s
conclusions. I. I. Vil'son, a respected representative of Russian statistics within the
Imperial Russian Geographic Society, noted in his study of the redemption operation
that the main cause of arrears (outside of fires, crop failures and other ‘temporary’
setbacks) was the fact that in many regions soil quality and other geographic factors
precluded any correspondence between redemption payments and income from
peasant allotments.68 The economist L. Khodskii, arguing against Samarin, agreed.
According to Khodskii's calculations the biggest discrepancy was in Perm’ province,
where redemption payments exceeded ‘bank value’ by more than 70%. Peasants
received the best deal in Astrakhan province; there the land’s bank value exceeded
redemption payments by nearly 178%. At times, provincial figures obscured regional
variations in soil quality. Thus even though bank value exceeded redemption payments
by around 20% and 90% for Chernigov and Kursk provinces respectively, a closer
examination revealed that all peasants in these provinces did not share this good
fortune.69
Thus, in spite of the fact that redemption payments were based (out of necessity)
on peasants’ ability to pay, by the end of the 1870s an increasing number of statistical
studies focused attention instead on allotment value itself—a cadastre measurement of
peasant well-being—rather than total peasant household income. These studies turned
agrarian crisis into an established fact, especially in terms of providing an explanation
for what officials saw as a key indicator of crisis: the increase in tax and redemption
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payment arrears.70 Rural poverty now had a ‘scientifically’ determined cause.
Literary descriptions of the countryside as cesspools of poverty and despair put a
human face on these cold numerical facts.71

Redemption Payment Reductions
In this atmosphere the government began the task of reviewing the redemption
process. Law required the government to either force redemption or re-assess the
obrok payments of so-called ‘temporarily-obligated’ peasants after twenty years. This
term expired in 1881. The redemption operation’s profitability also convinced some
officials that the government had a moral obligation to reconsider redemption amounts.
Furthermore, a commission reviewing tax codes believed that tax reform made sense
only after review of other obligations.72 The process of reducing redemption payments
reveals the increasing application of cadastre measurement principles to the peasant
economy, a process that reinforced the idea that the emancipation statute, rather than
providing a patriarchal guarantee of sufficiency and an improvement in peasant life, had
overcharged peasants for their land and plunged peasant agriculture into crisis.
A Finance Ministry commission reviewing the redemption operation reached a
similar conclusion. Data from several sources indicated that, although random
catastrophes (fires, epidemics, crop failures) initiated the cycle of decline, the
incongruency between redemption payments and allotment income guaranteed the
perpetual impoverishment of many villages. A vicious cycle ensued, whereby arrears
led to a depletion of assets (sale of livestock and hence, fertilizer), and more arrears.
Non black-soil regions, which required regular and substantial amounts of manure,
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suffered most acutely. Collected data also led the commission to the conclusion that
‘cut-offs’ exacerbated this condition. Emancipated peasants thus no longer had
sufficient means to make payments of their previous size.73 Furthermore, the
commission's own comparison of redemption values and current land prices revealed a
large discrepancy. For example, land in Smolensk province valued at 27.33
rubles/desiatina for redemption purposes had a current market value of only 15.80
rubles/desiatina. The Editing Commissions had assumed that all land yielded an
income of at least five percent on capital. In the case of Smolensk province this meant
that redemption payments of 1.64 rubles/desiatina should in reality be only 0.79
rubles/desiatina—a 52.1% reduction. These figures, as well as those for twenty-two
other provinces, indicated that redemption payments could be aligned with actual land
values only by reducing them to 41.5% of the current annual assessment (i.e., reducing
total collections from 20,045,450 to 8,327,268 rubles).74
The idea that redemption payments exceeded actual allotment value became
axiomatic as discussion passed through yet another commission to the stage of policy
formation. The new commission included a number of peasant affairs ‘experts’ from
Russia's zemstvos.75 Their opinions provided a basis for the reduction statutes enacted
in December 1881. The commission majority took what it believed to be a strict
constructionist approach to the redemption issue. It argued that it was ‘impossible’ to
consider former serf obrok payments (or barshchina—corvée—converted into cash) as
anything like rent and quoted the Editing Commissions’ work to the effect that there was
little correlation between allotment size and the size of obligations. Furthermore,
although the majority (led by Dmitrii Samarin and Prince A. A. Shcherbatov) agreed that
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there was a crisis in rural Russia, it also believed that as the emancipation statute
concerned the empire as a whole, morally the state could only adjust the terms of
emancipation in such a way that all peasants were treated equally. Linking payments to
allotment income would be merely an economic move; the ‘personal element, which
comprises its [the redemption relationship's] main basis’ demanded that the state
ensure that obligations did not exceed the ‘paying powers of the peasant’ from all
sources of peasant income. The majority extended this argument to include a call for
tax reform (especially abolishing the poll tax) and equalizing taxes among all categories
of peasants.76 The majority opinion reflected the traditional patriarchal approach to the
peasantry maintained by government and serf-owner alike—the idea of sufficiency as
total household income rather than actual allotment value.
The commission minority agreed with the majority's interpretation of the
emancipation statute, but argued that the majority's case ignored other aspects of the
redemption process and presented a static view of the issue. According to the minority
report, although the original spirit and method of calculating redemption payments
pointed towards defining them as personal obligations, other aspects of the redemption
program, including the actual redemption process, pointed towards a different
conclusion. ‘Obrok’, noted the minority report,
represents a permanent payment…that can be raised or lowered over a defined
time period according to pomeshchik or peasant demands.... Redemption
payments are limited payments, restricted to a set number of years and including
a component absent in obrok, namely a percent of remittance. This radical
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difference between the two types of payments directly demonstrates that it is
impossible to attach the same meaning to redemption payments as to obrok....77
Redemption payments, in reality, were akin to payments on a loan. The minority
report also argued that peasants recognized ‘very clearly and forcefully…the difference
existing between redemption payments and other collections levied upon them’,
knowing well how many payments remained until the land was fully redeemed. As
such, the redemption operation was unlike tax reform, and any decision to lower
payments should be based on financial criteria related to the actual redemption
process.78 In other words, although ‘ability to pay’ and ‘the improvement of peasant life’
guided the Editing Commissions as they developed the redemption process, a system
based on substantially different criteria—land value—resulted from their deliberations.
The minority proposed that redemption payments be brought in line with allotment
income on a province-by-province basis. Zemstvo land assessment figures and other
data could provide information for this purpose. Areas deemed especially needy
deserved reduction priority. The minority recommended a general ten percent reduction
only after adjusting redemption payments to correspond with assessed value.79 Thus
the minority, by using the cadastre conception of sufficiency, kept alive the main idea
behind the perception of agrarian crisis—namely the idea that there should be a closer
correlation between the size of redemption payments and the value of the allotments
being redeemed.
This idea appeared in the final text of the reduction statute. The law incorporated
the majority’s view that the reduction should be empire-wide, including most of
European Russia and western Siberia, and increased the initial reduction sum to twelve
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million rubles. At this point, the influence of the minority report and the idea of crisis
came into play. The law earmarked part of the twelve million rubles for a general
reduction of redemption payments. Part of the sum, however, was set aside for a
supplemental reduction (dobavka) for villages with economies in ‘disorder’
(razstroistvo). The most important indicator of disorder (and hence, eligibility for a
supplemental reduction) was a discrepancy between redemption payments and
allotment values.80 This aspect of the program colored the entire process, especially
as—by involving all of Russia's zemstvo institutions—implementing the supplementary
reductions became a very public affair. In addition, supplementary reductions rested on
a much tighter correlation between redemption payments and allotment income than the
majority's conception of redemption payments (redemption of obligations) allowed.
Implementing the supplemental reduction highlighted the tension between ‘sufficiency’
in a traditional sense and sufficiency as measured in cadastre terms, and further
implanted the notion of peasant economic crisis.

The Supplemental Reduction
The zemstvo experts also considered reduction fund allocation methods.
Because the majority considered the reduction process as correcting tax inequalities, it
recommended that the peasant's ability to pay be gauged by a wide variety of economic
indicators. Its list included the percentage change in population, average allotment size
and value, soil quality, the rise or fall of non-agricultural employment opportunities, and
total arrears. The majority acknowledged that such a list precluded the ‘mathematical
accuracy’ of calculating allotment income, but noted that ‘such accuracy is often
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misleading’. The primary goal of equating payments with total ability to pay dictated
that supplementary reductions be assigned after collection and consideration of a broad
spectrum of economic factors.81
Since the minority advocated reductions only on the basis of discrepancies
between redemption payments and allotment value (i.e., that the reduction operation
was a refinancing of debt based on new information, not tax relief), it recommended
indicators related to land values, particularly zemstvo tax assessment figures.82 In a
special opinion, Prince A. I. Vasil'chikov, an expert on peasant agriculture, gave
qualified support to the minority's view. He noted that consideration of outside sources
of income was superfluous to the business at hand, and would soon be taken into
account in the process of tax reform. Even though land value could be figured only
imperfectly, when combined with other (also imperfect) indicators such as livestock
numbers, it remained the best available indicator of whether or not excessive
redemption payments caused economic distress.83 Thus, the original tension between
competing definitions of redemption payments manifested itself again when it came to
recommending supplemental reduction criteria (i.e., measures of ‘sufficiency’). Although
the general reduction reflected state recognition that redemption payments were more
than mortgages, the implementation of the project emphasized the opposite idea (i.e., a
close correlation between redemption payments and land values).
With these recommendations in hand, the Central Statistical Committee (TsSK)
began collecting data on three forms in the second half of 1881. Form 2 requested
information on temporarily obligated peasants’ obrok payments and arrears as of
January 1, 1881.84 The TsSK then asked that zemstvos use information from Forms 1
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and 2 to complete Form 3. When completed, this form listed villages whose
economic ‘disarray’ required a supplementary reduction. In defining ‘disarray’, the TsSK
asked that zemstvos consider only systemic causes related to the quality of land
allotments, such as the fact that redemption payments exceeded actual income in
normal years. Land shortages and other ‘temporary’ setbacks (fire, crop failure, etc.)
were not grounds for inclusion on Form 3, since the state was mostly concerned that
redemption payments reflected the true worth of peasant allotments.85 Thus, although
questions on Forms 1 and 2 pertained to collecting a broad base of information for
determining the peasant's ability to pay (in line with the majority), the minority's
emphasis on value prevailed on Form 3.
The TsSK used information from all three forms to award supplementary
reductions. The award process illustrates the general acceptance of a cadastre
paradigm (i.e., that peasant allotment land could be measured like any other) and the
pervasiveness of the view that rural crisis stemmed from an imbalance between
redemption payments and land values—from a new conception of sufficiency that
defined the ability to pay (i.e., measured peasant well-being) solely in terms of land
productivity and market criteria. What seemed sufficient to emancipators, or even the
zemstvo expert majority (ability to pay), became increasingly less so when zemstvos
had to justify supplemental reductions. The TsSK’s evaluation of property for
supplemental reductions in terms of soil quality and other criteria reflecting allotment
value gives credence to this interpretation.
The Riazan' province report provides a good example, for it was TsSK director P.
P. Semenov’s home province and the subject of his own recent research (1878-1879).86
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In addition, the issue erupted into open dispute in the Dankovsk district zemstvo.
Two deputies demanded that the governing board omit land shortage from the factors
that qualified villages to be included on Form 3. Considering land shortage, they
argued, implied that the emancipation had cheated peasants. Another deputy
disagreed, and his argument illustrates how the idea of crisis, both in terms of land
shortage and excessive redemption payments, had permeated society. Pointing to
Ianson’s work, N. I. Kotov argued that the question of insufficient peasant land
allotments had already been demonstrated "in the sense that the size of allotments has
been recognized as insufficient both for sustenance and for the fulfillment of tax
obligations." He also noted that the zemstvo itself had reached this conclusion ten
years earlier while considering government tax reform proposals.87 The deputies
resolved to consider all of these factors.
Compared to other Riazan' province districts, Dankovsk peasants enjoyed
above-average economic conditions. Although the average number of cattle per
household (0.8) indicated certain insufficiencies, the number of horses and adult male
workers per household (1.5 and 1.7, respectively) and average per capita allotment size
(2.2 desiatinas) were at or above provincial averages.88 Redemption payment arrears
totaled only sixteen percent of annual collections. The zemstvo, however, listed more
than half (121) of the districts 237 villages as being in a state of economic disorder.
According to the zemstvo's information, twenty-four of the 121 villages were on the list
by virtue of the quality of their allotments. The rest owed their spot to a variety of other
causes. For the TsSK, however, most of these other maladies did not address the
point, which was allotment value as reflected in its ability to produce an income. The
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TsSK did not doubt that the zemstvo raised a number of valid concerns. It noted,
however, that problems such as shortages of land, employment opportunities and credit
were difficult to measure and, in fact, characterized the whole district.89 The zemstvo’s
only credible case was what could be measured—the value of allotments as compared
with redemption payments. This indicator could rightly serve as a basis for a permanent
reduction of redemption payments, while the other causes could, at best, serve as a
basis for temporary relief. Thus, the TsSK only awarded supplementary reductions to
the twenty-four villages where the zemstvo demonstrated that allotment income fell
short of the sum charged for redeeming the plots.90 Land value compared to
redemption payments became a measure of the condition of peasant villages.
The Bezhetsk district (Tver' province) report also exemplified a cadastre measure
of ‘sufficiency’. Based on previous zemstvo statistical work and other data, the zemstvo
concluded that it was ‘impossible not to recognize that existing redemption
payments...in several townships do not correspond to the land’s productive
capabilities...’. This meant that any reduction in payments ‘should not in any way be
equal for all locations, but should correspond to the quality and productive capabilities of
the soil’. To remedy the situation, the zemstvo asked the TsSK to accept the land
values it derived through statistical investigation. These values, calculated by
subtracting production costs from gross income, indicated that redemption payments for
two groups of villages required reductions of twenty-five and fifty percent in order to
correspond to actual allotment value.91 The TsSK concurred that poor soil quality
created a large disparity between income and payments. It split the difference between
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the zemstvo's reduction requests, granting villages with the greatest discrepancy
between payments and income a thirty percent supplementary reduction.92
The case of Solikolamsk district (Perm' province) adds another layer of
understanding to this process. The zemstvo argued that, based on ‘experienced data’
(i. e. data obtained from deputies' own agricultural endeavors), redemption payments
exceeded net allotment land income per desiatina over a four-year period.93 Only
villages with hayfields, key to maintaining livestock herds and fertilizer supplies, had
profitable allotments. 94 One might wonder why no accounts of mass starvation
accompanied the report, given the absence of peasant income for four years. The lack
of such reports can be explained by the fact the zemstvo deputies saw the peasantry
through the cadastre paradigm. Deputies calculated average income based on their
own experience, that is, as if the same notion of profit driving their own economic
activity also motivated neighboring peasants.
The Stavropol' district zemstvo (Samara province) submitted a more
sophisticated analysis which also presented a contradictory portrait of the local
economy. As with the example above, the contradiction stemmed from the zemstvo
deputies' view of the peasant economy as little different from their own farming. After
completing an inventory of the district’s 105 peasant communities, deputies calculated
average figures for family composition, livestock inventory, land tilled, harvests, and
expenses (including taxes). They used these figures to create a hypothetical ‘average’
peasant family budget. The compilers attempted to account for every possible income
and expenditure, including arrears. The final figure in the expense column totaled
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nearly forty-two rubles more than the hypothetical ‘average’ peasant family’s
calculated income.95
But, once again, there were no reports of starving villages. The zemstvo
conceded that none of the villages inhabited by their average peasant were in a state of
‘disorder’. Deputies argued, however, that ‘because of small allotments in Stavropol’
district, redemption payments seem higher, and thus seem to correspond less to the
advantages extracted from the lands of the province as a whole’.96 Thus, the
discrepancy between income and expenses should make at least four villages eligible
for a supplemental reduction. The TsSK conceded the detailed nature and proper
foundation of the zemstvo's case, but hesitated to grant a supplemental reduction
because of the area's soil quality. Semenov and his co-workers believed that, given the
district’s high fertility, the 14% general reduction would be sufficient to align income and
payments. However, the TsSK—acknowledging that the relationship between payments
and allotment income resulted from the quality of particular allotments—gave the
Samara provincial zemstvo great latitude in distributing the province’s supplemental
funds in accordance with local surveys. Stavropol’ ultimately received 3,281 of the
province’s 12,660 ruble reduction funds. As with the case in Solikolamsk district, the
fact that pomeshchiki calculated peasant income as if peasant economic behavior
differed little from their own led to an incongruity between the data and reality. The
TsSK and the provincial zemstvo ultimately supported these figures, bolstering both the
idea that sufficiency could be measured in cadastre terms and the notion of rural
crisis.97
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In the rare case where a zemstvo argued for a supplemental reduction on the
basis of peculiarities in peasant agriculture, the TsSK ignored that evidence and
emphasized a reduction based on soil quality and allotment value alone. The report for
Saratov's Kuznetsk district argued that, although local land values were high, this did
not reflect the true value and income potential of peasant land. The zemstvo asked for
a blanket reduction of twenty-five percent for all of the villages listed on Form 3, noting
that certain aspects of peasant agriculture, such as the "stretching" of allotments into
elongated strips, hindered animal husbandry and required ‘a double or triple
expenditure of labor for tillage’. This reduced the value of such land in comparison with
non-peasant lands of equal fertility. The zemstvo received its reduction, but not on the
basis of this argument. The TsSK justified granting the zemstvo's request, once again,
on the basis of soil quality. Added evidence of high redemption payment arrears
convinced the committee that there was a discrepancy between payments and the clay
soil’s ability to produce an income.98 Sufficiency in terms of value prevailed.

Conclusion
Only further demographic and consumption research will ultimately reveal the
existence or extent of Russia’s agrarian crisis. What the above narrative suggests is
the role of continuity and change in history. The paternalistic conception of sufficiency
developed within the serf economy and embodied in the ‘great principles’ of the
emancipation process—combined with the increasing application of capitalist
measurement to a non-capitalist economy (i.e., one where family subsistence needs
supercede profit considerations)—created the perception of a rural crisis rooted in the
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insufficiency of peasant allotments. Thus, although we now have reason to question
the actual existence of crisis (e.g., peasants seldom defaulted on redemption
payments), the pre-1861 serf economy ironically emerged to contemporaries as a
golden era where access to adequate resources enabled peasants to meet subsistence
needs and payments.99
The emancipation process itself laid the groundwork for a perception of rural
crisis. On one hand, it acknowledged and set out to perpetuate a subsistence-oriented
peasant economy and a market oriented noble economy—at least until such a future
time that enlightenment integrated the benighted peasantry into the market.
Furthermore, Samarin and the majority of zemstvo experts were correct in seeing the
emancipation as a process that involved interests beyond those of the peasantry.
However, at the same time the emancipation (like Kiselev’s earlier reforms) raised the
issue of the value of peasant land allotments. Although emancipators relied on peasant
ability to pay as a means of determining redemption payments (rejecting a formal
cadastre as impractical), the state’s plans to compensate pomeshchiki and charge
peasants pushed those involved to conceptualize Russia’s rural economy in cadastre
terms (i.e., as a single rural economy that could be measured by market criteria). The
emancipation combined traditional paternalism and its conception of sufficiency as total
household income (the ‘great principles’) with a new measure of sufficiency as land
value. Thus, as increasing data on peasant income became available in the
emancipation’s wake, Ianson’s and others’ studies of peasant income and payments all
applied a cadastre measure to gauge the condition of the peasant economy. Their
discoveries attributed peasant distress to the insufficiency of peasant allotments—

35
specifically a non-congruence between redemption payments and allotment value.
These works gave the idea of crisis a new statistical reality and covered it with a thick
scientific veneer. The emancipation appeared in a new and more sinister light: not only
had the peasantry been deprived of all the land, but the land they received was overpriced.
Although statutory and practical issues led to reconsideration of redemption
payments, a sense of crisis—embodied in alarming data on arrears—added urgency to
the project. Here, as with the original emancipation process, a tension emerged
between peasant ability to pay (the position of the zemstvo expert majority) and the
actual value of allotments (the concerns of the zemstvo expert minority). Although the
reduction process made allowances for non-agricultural income (ability to pay),
Semenov and the TsSK increasingly attached primary significance to allotment value as
a measure of peasant household sufficiency—especially in the allocation of
supplemental reductions. The non-correspondence of allotment value and redemption
payments was a primary indicator of economic ‘disorder’. This was a cadastre view of
the peasant economy, a paradigm of a single rural economy (rather than separate
peasant and pomeshchik spheres) wherein the value of agricultural land was universally
determinable by subtracting market production costs from commodity prices. In this
way the government’s own procedures in the reduction process, based on the idea that
peasant land value could be calculated in market terms, perpetuated a cadastre
conception of sufficiency and the notion of crisis. This perception persisted as a
motivation behind state agrarian policy for the remainder of Empire’s existence.
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